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This paper considers the currency composition of sovereign debt in the context of risk-
sharing through excusable defaults. It is shown that monetary credibility is not a 
sufficient condition for borrowing in domestic currency.  With real exchange rate risk, 
debt denominated in a borrowing country’s currency can be too state-contingent to 
support international lending on purely reputational considerations, even when debt 
denominated in the lending country’s currency is viable.  The model can explain the 
geographical pattern of bond issuance, the phenomenon of “original sin”, and the 
concentration of defaults on foreign-currency debt. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It is well known that emerging-market sovereign debt issued on the world’s major 
exchanges is overwhelmingly denominated in foreign currency (Hausmann and Panizza, 
2003).  This paper examines this phenomenon in the context of a theoretical model of 
sovereign debt.  Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) present a model of international 
lending in which partial default can be excused in identifiably bad states of the world, and 
is followed by a resumption of lending.  In such a model payments to lenders are de facto 
state-contingent.  Alfaro and Kanczuk (2005) provide a quantitative assessment of this 
model, and conclude that it fits the empirical data provided that there are output losses 
associated with default. In practice, even when partial default is eventually accepted by 
the lenders, output losses can arise while the precise extent of default is subject to 
negotiation, because of high interest rates and depressed capital flows (Flandreau and 
Zumer, 2004).  These output losses are, of course, precisely what has motivated concern 
about the costs of “dependence” on foreign debt. 
Theoretical analysis of sovereign debt has focused on a world of many legal 
jurisdictions but a single currency.  These assumptions are a reflection of two important 
features of the real world – that defaults have been much more frequent on debt 
denominated in foreign currency, and that sovereign debt is overwhelmingly denominated 
in the currency of the market in which it is issued.
1  Emerging-market countries tend to 
have their debt issued in the world’s major financial markets, and therefore in foreign 
currency – a phenomenon that has become known as “original sin” (Eichengreen and 
Hausmann, 1999). 
                                                           
1 Manasse et al. (2003) provide a list of sovereign defaults over the period 1970-2001.  Russia 1998 is an 
exception to the rule that defaults only afflict foreign-currency debt.   2
Opinions differ as to the explanation of the low default rate on domestic-currency 
debt.  The cynical view is that the benefits of default can be obtained, without the costs, 
by simply printing money and exploiting the inflation tax.  Another possibility is that 
governments are inhibited from default on debt that is owned to a significant extent by 
domestic residents whose welfare it values (Tirole, 2002).  The latter interpretation 
implies that the low default rate on domestic-currency debt is in part a consequence of 
original sin, since domestic residents would be less likely to hold this debt if it were 
issued on foreign financial markets. 
This paper develops a model of sovereign debt in which domestic bond markets are 
costly to establish.  The borrowing government is interested in its purchasing power over 
foreign goods, but suffers real exchange rate uncertainty because of the fluctuating price 
of the country’s exports.  Debt may be indexed to either the import or the export price.  In 
the latter case (which corresponds to debt denominated in domestic currency), payments 
are strongly state-contingent, which is desirable for the borrowers, but, as we shall see, 
this also implies that lending is more likely to be undermined by the threat of repudiation.  
In the former case (debt denominated in foreign currency), payments are in principle not 
state-contingent but may in practice be partially so (if there are excusable defaults).  The 
costly development of domestic bond markets may be regarded as an investment in a 
commitment not to repudiate domestic-currency debt by ensuring that there is a 
significant constituency of domestic bondholders.  It is shown that the phenomenon of 
original sin may arise if (a) servicing of domestic-currency debt is too state-contingent to 
support lending, (b) if the output costs of default are sufficiently low and (c) if the costs 
of developing domestic bond markets are too high relative to the benefits.  The main   3
message of the paper is that monetary credibility is not a sufficient condition for being 




The model is based on that of Cole and Kehoe (1995).  There are two countries, each 
using the same currency.  One has a risk-neutral government which is a monopolist of an 
investment project but initially has no resources to exploit it.  The other consists of risk-
neutral bankers who compete to lend to this government.  All agents have a discount 
factor of β, and competition amongst bankers forces the gross interest rate down to r = 
1/β.  The returns to the investment project are of the following pattern: in alternate 
periods they are zero, and in alternate periods an investment of one unit in the previous 
period produces output of a non-storable commodity of A > r.  There is a maximum 
investment of one.  The government has a linear per-period utility function in 
consumption: 
 U (ct) = ct  (1) 
Thus, if t is odd, the government borrows and invests one unit and consumes nothing.  If t 
is even, the government has output of A from the previous period’s investment, repays 
debt of r, borrows and invests nothing, and consumes A – r.  Alternatively, the 
government could repudiate the debt, after which there is no further lending.  As Cole and 
Kehoe (1995) show, repudiation is always preferable if the government is able to save the   4
resources obtained and earn a gross return of r on them.
2 Therefore we assume that the 
government is unable to save, and that repudiation implies immediate consumption of the 
entire output, with zero output in all future periods. 
  This model is modified here in the following respects.  First, the countries have 
separate currencies, and there is production in the lending country.  Second, utility is 
derived only from consumption of the real output of the lending country.  Third, bonds 
may be issued on financial markets in the lending or the borrowing country, and in either 
currency.  At time zero, the financial markets in the borrowing country do not exist.  
There is a sunk cost C in establishing them, and the government makes a binding 
commitment that bonds issued in the borrowing country are never repudiated.
3  
Finally, the output of the borrowing country is exchanged for imports from the 
lending country at an uncertain real exchange rate (p).  The real exchange rate, which is 
specified as the purchasing power of the borrower’s currency over the lenders’ currency, 
is assumed to be one in each odd period, and to be uniformly distributed over the range (1 
– x, 1 + x) in each even period.  If x is large enough that A(1 – x) < r, the borrowing 
country does not have enough resources to repay the debt in full when the loan is 
denominated in the lenders’ currency and p is low.  This is assumed to be a situation of 
excusable partial default, in the sense of Grossmann and Van Huyck (1988).  If excusable 
default occurs, the borrowers hand over all of the output to the lenders, who are able to 
verify that the consumption of the borrowers is zero, but lending resumes in the next 
period. Clearly, in this case loans incorporate a default risk premium. 
                                                           
2 As Grossman and Han (1999) show, this is the consequence of the risk-neutrality of the borrower.  With 
risk-averse borrowers and state-contingent debt repayments, repudiation is not necessarily optimal when the 
borrowers can save.   5
 
Solution 
In addition to the option of never borrowing and having consumption of zero in all 
periods, the borrowing country has three choices, which we examine in turn. 
(a) Borrow in domestic currency on foreign markets (DCFM); 
(b) Borrow in foreign currency on foreign markets (FCFM); 
(c) Invest in the development of domestic bond markets and use them to borrow in 
domestic currency (DCDM). 
 
Borrowing in domestic currency on foreign markets (DCFM) 
Debt of this form can be supported if, whatever the realisation of the real exchange rate, 
the benefits of future borrowing exceed the gains from repudiation.  If the real exchange 
rate at time t is pt, and t is an even number, then repudiation of the debt at time t yields 
discounted utility of  
U(R) = Apt. (2) 
Here R denotes repudiation. The expected utility of repaying the debt [U(N, DC)] is: 
) (
1
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.      (3) 
The first term on the right-hand side represents utility in period t, and the second term 
represents the discounted expected utility of consumption in future even periods, when p 
is on average equal to one.  Note that debt repayments are highly state-contingent, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
3 This assumption captures the idea that bonds issued in the borrowing country attract domestic investors, 
thus increasing the political cost of repudiation.  For the costs involved in establishing domestic debt 
markets, see Litan et al. (2003).   6
because they are indexed to the real exchange rate.  Debt will not be repudiated if U(R) < 










.          ( 4 )  
If there are any values of p for which this condition is not met, lenders know that with 
some probability the debt will be repudiated, and we assume that they therefore do not 
lend.
4  Allowing for the fact that β
 = 1/r and that pt has a maximum value of 1 + x, the 
condition for debt never to be repudiated is that 
  A ≥  r
3 + xr(r
2 – 1) = A* .         ( 5 )  
This condition ensures that debt will be repaid even when the amount due is at its 
maximum value.  Note that, as x increases, implying greater real exchange rate volatility, 
this condition is less likely to be met.  Equation (5) has to hold for lenders to be willing to 
buy bonds issued in the borrower’s currency in foreign markets. 
 
Borrowing in foreign currency on foreign markets (FCFM) 
In this case the debt is no longer indexed to the real exchange rate.  There are two cases: 
where export revenues are always sufficient to repay the debt, and where they are not.  
The first case arises when A(1 – x) ≥ r.  Then repudiation yields the same utility as 
before, whilst repayment yields an expected utility of 
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2





.        ( 6 )  
The condition that U(R) ≤ U(N, DC) is 
                                                           
4 If the probability of repudiation is low, it is possible that the lenders could lend at an interest rate premium 
until repudiation occurs, and that this could be consistent with their zero-profit condition..  We assume that, 
if lenders have offered such a contract in the past, repudiation has occurred and lending has ceased.   7









         ( 7 )  
or, since β = 1/r, 
  A ≥  r
3            (8) 
This is a less stringent condition for non-repudiation than for domestic-currency debt for 
any x > 0.  The reason is that the resources which can be confiscated by the debtor in 
repudiating the debt are fixed in terms of the lenders’ currency (but with the same mean 
as in the case of borrowing in domestic currency).  Since the no-repudiation condition 
depends on the maximum resources measured in the lenders’ currency which the debtor 
can confiscate, repudiation is less likely in this case.
 
  Now consider the possibility that A(1 – x) < r.  Assume that the lenders can 
recognise that this is the case, and are willing to accept payment of the entire output in 
this situation, reducing the borrower’s consumption to zero.  Further assume that default 
entails an output cost of z.  To cover the risk of partial default, which has a probability of 
q, lenders charge a higher interest rate R.  Lenders receive R with a probability of 1 – q 
and Ap – z with a probability of q, and the borrower’s consumption is respectively Ap – R 
or zero.  Mean consumption is A – r – qz.  Since lenders must have an expected return of 
r, R must satisfy the following equations: 
  r z
x A R
q R q = −
− +
+ − ) (
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Equation (10) follows from the assumptions about the probability distribution of p.  This 
yields a quadratic in R for which the valid solution is:   8
  ) (
2 ) ( 4 ) 1 ( z z r A Ax z x A R + − − − − + =       (11) 
  ) (




1 z z r A Ax
Ax Ax
z
q + − − − − =       (12) 
Note that ∂R/∂x > 0 and ∂q/∂x > 0.
5 
If period t is a non-default period, the expected utility of repayment is then: 
  ) (
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) , ( 2
2





.      (13) 
If period t is a default period, the utility of non-repudiation will be less than this, because 
consumption in period t will be zero.  Consequently, to show that debt will not be 
repudiated, it is sufficient to demonstrate that it will not be repudiated in non-default 
periods.  
  Comparing equations (2) and (13), we can see that foreign-currency debt will not 










.         ( 1 4 )  
Since a rise in x raises both R and q, this condition is less likely to be satisfied when real 
exchange rates are more volatile, and also when the output costs of default are greater.  
Substituting for q from (10), this condition may also be written: 
  *
) 1 ( 2
) 1 ( ) ( 2 2
2 2 R A
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5 This is true because Ax > (A – r), otherwise R = r.   9
Borrowing in domestic currency on domestic markets (DCDM) 
We assume that the sunk cost, C, of developing domestic bond markets is paid in an even 
period for borrowing in the following odd period.  Although it is possible to issue 
foreign-currency debt once the cost C has been paid, this is inferior if it involves output 
costs associated with periodic default.  Hence we assume that only domestic-currency 
debt is issued on domestic markets.  The expected utility of investing in this development 
is: 








.        ( 1 6 )  
This reflects the fact that investment of C in period t generates utility of (A – r) in periods 
t+2, t+4 and so on. 







 can be achieved without the 
expenditure of C by borrowing in domestic currency on foreign markets, and the cost C is 
not paid. 
If A < A* and R > R*, then the country is unable to borrow on foreign markets, 
and it will invest in the development of domestic bond markets provided that U(DCDM) 
> 0, or 




r A C −
− β
β
p = CH.         ( 1 7 )  
 Finally,  if  A < A* and R < R*, the country is borrowing in foreign currency on 
foreign markets, and it invests in the development of domestic bond markets only if 
U(DCDM) > U(N, FC).  Since U(N, FC) > 0 in this case, this is a more stringent 
condition than C < CH.  The prospective value of U(N, FC) is:   10
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.        ( 1 8 )  
Comparing this with (16) gives the result that U(DCDM) > U(N, FC) if 






p = CL         ( 1 9 )  
 
or in other words that C is less than the present value of the future output costs of default. 
It is clear from inspection that CL < CH. 
 
 
Table 1.  Patterns of lending as a function of various parameters 
  Cost of developing domestic bond markets (C) 
  C > CH  CH > C > CL  C < CL 
  (high) (medium) (low) 
 
A ≥ A*  DCFM DCFM DCFM 
 
A < A* and 
R ≤ R* 
FCFM FCFM DCDM 
A < A* and 
R > R* 
No lending  DCDM  DCDM 
Notes.  DCFM: borrowing in domestic currency on foreign markets; FCFM: borrowing in foreign 
currency on foreign markets; DCDM: borrowing in domestic currency on domestic markets.  See 







The results derived above may be summarised as shown in Table 1.  If conditions are 
very favourable (A ≥ A*), domestic-currency bonds can be issued on foreign markets.  If 
they are rather less favourable (A < A*), and defaults on foreign-currency bonds are 
sufficiently infrequent and costs of default not too high (R ≤ R*), only foreign-currency   11
bonds can be issued on foreign markets.  Further, if the costs of developing domestic 
bond markets are above a critical level, this situation will give rise to the phenomenon of 
“original sin”.  If, on the other hand, the costs of developing domestic bond markets are 
low, borrowing countries will develop their own bond markets.  Note that borrowing on 
foreign markets in foreign currency can discourage the development of domestic bond 
markets, i.e. “original sin” can be an optimal choice. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The model developed above shows that acquiring monetary credibility is not a sufficient 
condition for being able to borrow in domestic currency. With real exchange rate risk, 
loans denominated in the borrower’s currency are more state-contingent than loans 
denominated in the lenders’ currency.  In particular, debt payments denominated in the 
borrower’s currency fully reflect the real exchange rate when it is strong.  This increases 
the incentive to repudiate the debt.  Consequently, sovereign lending may be viable when 
it is denominated in the lenders’ currency but not when it is denominated in the 
borrower’s currency, even when the debt is indexed to the price level.  For this situation 
to arise, defaults on foreign-currency debt must be not too frequent and the output costs 
of default not too large. 
A country always has the option of investing in the development of its domestic 
bond markets, insuring investors against repudiation, but has less incentive to do so if it 
can borrow in foreign financial markets in foreign currency (and none if it can borrow in 
foreign markets in domestic currency). Hence we tend to observe the following pattern:   12
countries tend to borrow in domestic currency in domestic markets and in foreign 
currency in foreign markets, and defaults occur mostly in the latter case. 
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